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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nicholas James Longee appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the
jury verdicts finding him guilty of burglary, possession of stolen property, unlawful
possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft by disposing of stolen property, and the
persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings1
In March 2012, Camille Benedict, who was watching her parents’ rural Twin Falls
County home while they were vacationing in Las Vegas, noticed that the home had been
burglarized. (Trial Tr., p. 152, L.7 – p.163, L.17; p.167, Ls.12-21.) After consulting with
her father, it was determined that jewelry and five guns had been taken from the
residence. (Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.5-24; p.174, L.7 – p.175, L.14; p.225, Ls.1-9.) Benedict
also noticed that a pillowcase was missing from one of the pillows on a downstairs bed.
(Trial Tr., p.163, L.18 – p.164, L.13.) Police were notified and began an investigation.
(Trial Tr., p.194, L.6 – p. 196, L.17.)
Around the time of the burglary, Nicholas Longee was living in a Twin Falls
halfway house in a room next door to where Ken Worth resided. (Trial Tr., p.260, L.14 –
p.261, L.9.) In March 2012, Longee asked Worth if he knew anybody who would buy
five guns he had possession of. (Trial Tr., p.249, L.14 – p.250, L.5.) Longee told Worth
that the guns were currently in a pillowcase in a ditch, and that he had obtained them
from a house “out in the country.” (Trial Tr., p.250, Ls.12-24.) After Worth responded
1

The state draws its description of the underlying facts from the second jury trial, which
took place in February 2016.
1

that he did not know anybody who would be interested in purchasing guns, Longee asked
Worth to pick him up and drive him to Omar Padilla’s residence. (Trial Tr., p.251, Ls.818.) Worth did so, and then left Longee at Padilla’s residence. (Trial Tr., p.251, L.19 –
p.252, L.16.)
Longee told Padilla that he possessed some “thumpers” that were currently
located in Filer, Idaho, and asked Padilla if he would be interested in selling them. (Trial
Tr., p.296, Ls.1-25.) At this point, Padilla was under the impression that “thumpers” were
car speakers, which Padilla was interested in looking at. (Trial Tr., p.296, Ls.11-15;
p.343, L.2 – p.344, L.12.) Padilla’s girlfriend, Ashtyn Jones, then drove Padilla and
Longee in the direction of Filer. (Trial Tr., p.291, Ls.10-15; p.296, L.18 – p.299, L.14.)
Longee directed Jones to drive through Filer until they reached a certain point, far from
any residences. (Trial Tr., p.299, L.12 – p.300, L.22.) There, Longee got out of the car
and retrieved a pillowcase from a ditch. (Trial Tr., p.305, L.11 – p.307, L.2). After
Longee put the pillowcase in the trunk of the car, Jones, Padilla, and Longee drove back
to Twin Falls.

(Trial Tr., p.307, L.13 – p.308, L.2.)

There, Longee retrieved the

pillowcase and revealed that it contained guns. (Trial Tr., p.308, L.1 – p.310, L.18.)
Longee then asked Padilla to take the guns and sell them, to keep one for himself if he
was able to sell the rest, and to give the money to Longee. (Trial Tr., p.310, L.24 – p.311,
L.10.) Padilla, concerned that Longee may react negatively if he refused, agreed to take
the guns. (Trial Tr., p.312, Ls.4-25.)
After dropping Longee off, Padilla and Jones discussed what to do with the guns.
(Trial Tr., p.313, L.1 – p.315, L.7.) Padilla was concerned about possessing the guns
because he was, at that time, on felony probation, and because Jones was very upset upon
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learning about the guns. (Trial Tr., p.311, Ls.11-20; p.313, Ls.1-14.) After considering
disposing of the guns or taking them back to the ditch where Longee retrieved them, they
decided to contact a friend of Padilla’s who was dating a Twin Falls police officer. (Trial
Tr., p.313, L.15 – p.317, L.11.) At the friend’s residence, police were called and
recovered the guns. (Trial Tr., p.317, L.22 – p.321, L.14.) Sometime later, Longee
contacted Padilla and demanded payment for the guns. (Trial Tr., p.322, L.25 – p.323,
L.15.)

Longee also made contact with Worth and told him that he was mad because

Padilla “burnt him out of the money” for the guns. (Trial Tr., p.252, L.19 – p.253, L.11.)
Police were later able to determine that the pillowcase and the guns matched those taken
from the rural Twin Falls County residence. (Trial Tr., p.177, L.15 – p.178, L.18; p.225,
L.10 – p.231, L.17; p.442, Ls.1-18.) Also in March 2012, Worth sold some of the jewelry
that had been taken in the burglary to a pawn shop. (Trial Tr., p.239, L.14 – p.240, L.16;
p.434, L.18 – p.439, L.20.)
After an investigation which included interviews with Worth, Jones, and Padilla
(Trial Tr., p.441, Ls.7-22), the state charged Longee with burglary, grand theft by
possession of stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft
by disposing of stolen property, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement which
was based upon two prior burglary convictions. (See R., pp.717-718); State v. Longee,
2014 WL 587054 (Idaho App. February 14, 2014) (unpublished). The magistrate court
found that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support the burglary charge at
the preliminary hearing and thus bound Longee over to the district court only on the
remaining counts. (See R., p.717.) Longee, who represented himself at the subsequent
jury trial, was convicted on each of the remaining counts and the sentencing
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enhancement. See Longee, 2014 WL 587054. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the
convictions, but remanded the case for resentencing after concluding that the state
presented insufficient evidence to support the sentencing enhancement. See id.
Later, after Longee filed a post-conviction petition, the state stipulated to postconviction relief and a new trial.2 (R., pp.28-30, 660, 717, 748.) The state refiled the
burglary charge, which was bound over to the district court and consolidated with the
remaining charges for the new trial. (See R., p.717, 748.)
Longee was represented by counsel at the second jury trial. (See generally Trial
Tr.) The state’s witnesses included Padilla, Jones, the burglarized homeowner and his
daughter, and the investigating officers, who all testified consistently with the facts as set
forth above. (See generally id.) Worth elected to exercise his 5th Amendment rights and
refused to testify at the second trial. (2/16/16 Tr., p.9, L.18 – p.11, L.13.) The parties
stipulated that Worth was an unavailable witness, and that Worth’s previous sworn
testimony from the first trial and from the preliminary hearing held prior to the first trial
would be read into evidence at the second trial. (2/16/16 Tr., p.4, L.14 – p.5, L.20; Trial
Tr., p.241, L.24 – p.283, L.6.) A video of a police interview with Worth was also entered
into evidence and played for the jury. (Trial Tr., p.473, L.1 – p.476, L.15; Defendant’s
Exhibits 5a, 5b.) This testimony and evidence was also consistent with the facts as set
forth above.
The defense theory, as testified to by several inmate witnesses and as argued by
Longee’s defense counsel during closing argument, was that it was Padilla and/or Worth
2

It is unclear from the clerk’s record in this appeal what post-conviction ground the
state’s stipulation for relief was based upon, but Longee raised numerous claims
including a Brady violation based upon the state’s failure to discuss plea deals that had
been made with two of the state’s witnesses. (See R., p.717.)
4

who burglarized the house and stole the guns, that it was Padilla who tried to get Longee
to sell the guns, and that Padilla and Worth subsequently attempted to frame Longee for
the crime. (Trial Tr., p.510, L.9 – p.632, L.22; p.712, L.5 – p.725, L.18.)
During the trial, Longee also attempted to introduce certain testimony from
inmate witnesses Jason Ward and Don Gurley. According to Longee’s offer of proof,
Ward would have testified that while at ISCI, he overheard an individual (whom he
identified as Ken Worth by Worth’s nametag), talking about Longee. (Trial Tr., p.549,
Ls.1-17.) Because Ward knew Longee, he asked Worth what he was talking about. (Trial
Tr., p.549, Ls.18-20.) According to the proposed testimony, Worth responded by saying
that he and Padilla had stolen guns during a burglary, and that Padilla had ended up with
the guns. (Trial Tr., p.549, L.23 – p.550, L.3.) According to Ward, Worth also stated that,
despite Longee’s accusations to the contrary, Worth did not tell others that Longee was
actually responsible for the burglary. (Trial Tr., p.550, Ls.4-8.) Don Gurley would have
testified, according to the offer of proof, that Worth told him he had to “go along with”
Padilla after Padilla had chosen to implicate Longee for the burglary because the “cat’s
out of the bag.” (Trial Tr., p.592, L.11 – p.596, L.1.) Gurley also would have testified
that Worth told him “[t]hose were ours, and we took them,” which Gurley took to mean
that Worth and Padilla took the guns. (Trial Tr., p.595, L.15 – p.596, L.1.) The state
objected to Ward’s and Gurley’s proposed testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3). (Trial
Tr., p.550, L.12 – p.552, L.1; p.596, L.2 – p.597, L.5.)
After providing the parties a day to research the issue and present argument, the
district court granted the state’s motion to exclude Ward’s and Gurley’s proposed
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3) because it did not find there was sufficient

5

corroboration of the statements, as required by the rule. (Trial Tr., p.599, L.12 – p.601,
L.12; p.635, L.9 – p.647, L.7.)
The jury found Longee guilty of all charges. (R., pp.444-445; Trial Tr., p.735,
L.20 – p.737, L.9.) The jury also found that Longee had been convicted of two prior
burglary convictions and was subject to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(R., p.446; Trial Tr., p.751, L.23 – p.752, L.17.) The district court imposed concurrent
unified 20-year sentences with five years fixed on all charges. (R., pp.516-522; 4/12/16
Tr., p.32, L.10 – p.40, L.22.) Longee timely appealed. (R., pp.523-524.)

6

ISSUE
Longee states the issue on appeal as:
Did the court abuse its discretion when it excluded inculpatory
statements made by Kenneth Worth?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Longee failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by
excluding Ward’s and Gurley’s testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3)?

7

ARGUMENT
Longee Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Excluding Ward’s And Gurley’s Testimony Pursuant To I.R.E. 804(b)(3)
A.

Introduction
Longee contends that the district court abused its discretion by excluding

proposed testimony of Jason Ward and Don Gurley from evidence. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.5-13.) Specifically, Longee contends that the district court erred in applying I.R.E.
804(b)(3) and by concluding that the statements, which implicated Ken Worth and Omar
Padilla in the crimes for which Longee was charged, lacked adequate corroboration to be
admitted under the requirements of that hearsay exception. (Id.) A review of the record
reveals that the district court acted well within its discretion to exclude the testimony.
B.

Standard Of Review
Review of a trial court’s hearsay rulings “is limited to determining whether” the

district court’s decision was “within the outer boundaries of its discretion,” “consistent
with” applicable legal standards, and “reached through an exercise of reason.” In re
Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 941, 277 P.3d 380, 388 (2012).
When considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.” State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017)
(quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

8

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Exclude The Testimony
“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by” the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

I.R.E. 802. Idaho Rule of Evidence 804 enumerates hearsay exceptions applicable when
the declarant is unavailable to testify. Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides that
statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable and the
statement is against the declarant’s interest, including when the statement tends to subject
the declarant to civil or criminal liability. However, I.R.E. 804(b)(3) imposes a restriction
upon the admissibility of such statements when the statements tend to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and are offered in a criminal case. “A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered in a criminal case is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”
I.R.E. 804(b)(3).
In State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 241-243, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060-1062 (2009), the
Idaho Supreme Court analyzed I.R.E. 804(b)(3) and held that the “corroborating
circumstances” referenced in the rule are necessary and must “clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement.” Meister, 148 Idaho at 242, 220 P.3d at 1061 (quoting
State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 16-17, 909 P.2d 624, 634-635 (Ct. App. 1995)).
The Court also adopted the standard set forth in State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563 (Az.
1987), in which the Arizona Supreme Court interpreted A.R.S. 804(b)(3) and established
seven factors for determining the reliability and corroboration of a statement subject to the
hearsay exception established by that rule: (1) whether the declarant is unavailable; (2)
whether the statement is against the declarant’s interest; (3) whether corroborating
circumstances exist which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement, taking
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into account contradictory evidence, the relationship between the declarant and the
listener, and the relationship between the declarant and the defendant; (4) whether the
declarant has issued the statement multiple times; (5) whether a significant amount of
time has passed between the incident and the statement; (6) whether the declarant will
benefit from making the statement; and (7) whether the psychological and physical
surroundings could affect the statement. LaGrand, 734 P.2d at 569-570. The Arizona
Supreme Court ultimately held that “a judge’s inquiry, made to assure himself that the
corroboration requirement of Rule 804(b)(3) has been satisfied, should be limited to
asking whether evidence in the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant’s
statement would permit a reasonable person to believe that the statement could be true. If
a judge believes that a reasonable person could conclude from corroborating and
contradictory evidence in the record that the declarant’s statement could be true, then the
judge must admit the statement into evidence.” Id. at 570.
In this case, the district court excluded the proposed testimony of Ward and Gurley
pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3) after concluding that Longee failed to present sufficient
evidence in his offer of proof that would clearly corroborate the trustworthiness of the
statements. (Trial Tr., p.644, L.11 – p.647, L.7.) Prior to the court’s final ruling, Longee
primarily offered three potential bases for corroboration:3 (1) that evidence at trial
indicated that Worth had sold some of the jewelry obtained from the burglary to a pawn
shop; (2) that evidence at trial indicated a relationship between Worth and Padilla; and (3)
that Padilla and Worth declined to implicate each other during prior testimony and police
3

On appeal, Longee appears to proffer other potential corroborating circumstances.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.) This Court should not consider these circumstances because
they were not presented to the district court in Longee’s argument or offer of proof, and
were thus not considered by the district court.
10

interviews. (Trial Tr., p.639, L.24 – p.641, L.23; p.644, L.11 – p.645, L.19.) The district
court properly found that this proposed corroboration did not satisfy the requirements of
I.R.E. 804(b)(3).
First, evidence that Worth sold some of the stolen jewelry to the pawn shop did not
clearly corroborate Ward’s and Gurley’s second-hand statements that implicated Worth and
Padilla in the burglary, and Padilla in the framing of Longee. This evidence was consistent
with the state’s theory of the case that Longee committed the burglary and then transferred
the stolen property to others to sell. In light of Padilla’s testimony that Longee attempted to
utilize Padilla to sell the guns, it would not be surprising if Longee likewise attempted to
utilize Worth, his neighbor at the halfway house whom he saw nearly every day, to sell some
of the jewelry. Further, as the prosecutor pointed out to the district court (Trial Tr., p.646,
Ls.15-20), even assuming that Worth participated in the burglary and directly obtained the
jewelry before selling it to the pawn shop, this would also be consistent with the state’s
theory of the case. If Worth participated in the burglary with Longee and somehow ended
up with the jewelry, Longee could have still also given the guns to Padilla to sell. Therefore,
Worth’s sale of the stolen jewelry to the pawn shop did not clearly corroborate the specific
assertions set forth by Ward and Gurley that Worth and Padilla committed the burglary, and
that Padilla framed Longee.
Second, the fact that Worth and Padilla had a relationship provides no
corroboration of Ward’s and Gurley’s excluded statements. It was clear from the trial that
most of the relevant witnesses were at least aquatinted with each other through their state
and county incarcerations.

These existing and overlapping relationships between the

witnesses did not clearly corroborate the excluded statements or either party’s theory of the
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case; and a reasonable person would not believe, based upon these relationships, that Ward’s
and Gurley’s testimony could be true.
Finally, the state submits that Padilla’s and Worth’s failure to implicate each other
during their prior testimony and police interviews does not corroborate Ward’s and Gurley’s
statements, and in fact, if anything, made it less likely that a reasonable person would
believe that Ward’s and Gurley’s second-hand accounts regarding Padilla’s and Worth’s
alleged joint participation in the criminal activity were reliable. Instead, Padilla’s and
Worth’s prior testimony and police interviews would have corroborated the excluded
statements and the defense theory of the case if either Padilla or Worth had implicated the
other in that testimony or in those interviews.
Longee also contends that the district court erred by not considering all seven of the
factors as set forth by Meister. (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.) While the court did not
expressly, on the record, analyze each of the seven applicable factors, it is apparent from the
context of record that the court was familiar with, and applied, the applicable law as set forth
in Meister. After the district court initially sustained the state’s objection to the proposed
testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3), it allowed the parties an additional day to research
the issue and to present argument. (Trial Tr., p.553, Ls.8-15; p.597, Ls.22-25; p.599, L.12 –
p.601, L.12.)

The next day, Longee provided additional argument regarding I.R.E.

804(b)(3), cited Meister and the seven factors set forth in that case, individually discussed
each factor as it pertained to the facts of this case, and responded to the district court’s
questions regarding the proposed corroborative circumstances. (Trial Tr., p.635, L.9 –
p.643, L.18; p.644, L.16 - p.646, L.1.) The state presented argument in response. (Trial Tr.,
p.643, L.20 – p.644, L.10; p.646, L.3 – p.647, L.1.) After this, the court remarked that in
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light of the argument and authorities set forth by the parties, the issue was closer than it had
initially thought. (Trial Tr., p.647, Ls.2-7.) Still, the court declined to change its ruling, and
instead excluded the evidence. (Id.) There is no indication that the district court failed to
consider the argument and analysis that it specifically permitted the parties an extra day to
present. Therefore, Longee cannot demonstrate that the district court acted outside of its
discretion either by failing to perceive the issue as one of discretion, by acting outside the
boundaries of its discretion by misapplying I.R.E. 804(b)(3) as interpreted by Meister, or by
reaching its decision without an exercise of reason.
Further, while the court reasonably4 “focused” on what it felt was the “critical
factor” of whether corroborating circumstances existed which clearly indicated the
trustworthiness of the proposed testimony, several of the other factors set forth in Meister
support the district court’s conclusion: (1) Worth was unavailable to testify at the second
trial and the state therefore had no opportunity to cross-examine him regarding the
statements he allegedly made to Ward and Gurley; (2) While Worth’s alleged statements, on
their face, appear to be against his interest, it is unlikely that Worth believed he would be
subject to prosecution or other adverse consequences by making them in the context that he
allegedly did – to other inmates while incarcerated; (3) While there were some similarities
between the statements Worth allegedly made to Ward, and the statements Worth allegedly
made to Gurley, there was also an important distinction which limited the ability of the
statements to corroborate each other – Worth allegedly told Ward that he was not implicating
Longee in the burglary, but Worth allegedly told Gurley that he had no choice but to

4

The court reasonably focused its analysis on the third Meister factor (the existence of
corroborative circumstances), which most clearly appears in the text of I.R.E. 804(b)(3)
itself.
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implicate Longee once Padilla “took the cat out of the bag” by doing so; (4) It appears that a
significant amount of time passed between the March 2012 burglary and Worth’s alleged
statements to Ward and Gurley. Ward’s alleged conversation with Worth took place in
October 2014 (Defendant’s Exhibit 7). While Gurley did not testify about when his alleged
conversation with Worth took place, Longee appeared to represent to the court that the
proffered statements of both Ward and Gurley took place “sometime in 2014 and 2015”
(Trial Tr., p.642, Ls.19-23); (5) The “psychological or physical surroundings” of the prison
environment where Worth’s statements were allegedly made could very well affect the
reliability of the statements from the perspective of a reasonable jury.
The district court acted well within its discretion to exclude the proposed testimony
of Ward and Gurley pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(3).5 This Court should therefore affirm
Longee’s judgment of conviction.
D.

Any Error Was Harmless
“‘Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless error] is

whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have
contributed to the conviction.’” State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205
(1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. App.
1991)). In this case, the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the
proposed testimony of Ward and Gurley. However, even if the court erred, the exclusion

5

The state also notes that the proposed statements of Ward and Gurley asserting that
Worth implicated Padilla in the burglary were also inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E.
804(b)(3) because those portions of the statements did not tend to subject Worth to
criminal liability, as required by that rule. The prosecutor’s I.R.E. 804(b)(3) objection
below preserved that ground for appeal.
14

of the testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable possibility under the facts
of this case that the exclusion contributed to Longee’s convictions.
The jury was asked to make credibility determinations regarding the three state’s
witnesses who testified about the events (Padilla, Jones, and Worth) (Trial Tr., p.245,
L.20 – p.414, L.23), and five defense witnesses who alleged contacts with Padilla in
which Padilla implicated himself in the possession and attempted sale of the stolen guns
(Davis, LeBlanc, Ramey, Gurley,6 and Simpson) (Trial Tr., p.510, L.14 – p.632, L.22). In
order to reach a guilty verdict on all counts against Longee, the jury necessarily made
credibility determinations in favor of the state’s witnesses and against Longee’s. In light
of those determinations and the evidence presented at trial (as summarized in the
“Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings” of this brief), there is no
reasonable possibility that the excluded testimony of Ward and Gurley would have
resulted in a different verdict. In other words, it is unlikely that the alleged proposed
statements of Ken Worth, which were similar to statements attributed to Omar Padilla
that were presented at trial, would have altered the credibility determinations that the jury
made.
As the prosecutor emphasized during closing argument, state’s witness and
Padilla’s ex-girlfriend Ashtyn Jones was the only one of the eight substantive witnesses
listed above who was not connected to the others through their incarceration, and was the
only one who had no apparent potential motive or bias to testify falsely. (Trial Tr., p.707,
L.25 – p.708, L.12.)

To the contrary, Jones testified that she was no longer in a

relationship with Padilla at the present time and was, in fact, by the time of trial,
6

Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) did not apply to all of Gurley’s testimony, and
therefore not all of Gurley’s testimony was excluded by the district court.
15

attempting to get primary physical custody of their child in common and to terminate
Padilla’s parental rights. (Trial Tr., p.379, Ls.8-25; p.413, L.14 – p.414, L.2.)
Considering Jones’ lack of connection to the other witnesses and to the underlying
burglary, it is particularly unlikely that any credibility determinations that the jury made
in her favor would be altered by the testimony of Ward and Gurley about Worth.
Any error in the exclusion of the testimony could not reasonably have affected the
outcome of the case and was therefore harmless. Longee has failed to show any basis for
reversal.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction
entered upon the jury’s verdict finding Longee guilty of burglary, possession of stolen
property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft by disposing of
stolen property, and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2017.

_/s/ Mark W. Olson____________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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